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Abstract
A hybrid network–deterministic model for simulation of multiresistant pathogen spread
in a healthcare system is presented. The model accounts for two paths of pathogen transmis-
sion between the healthcare facilities: inter-hospital patient transfers (direct transfers) and
readmission of colonized patients (indirect transfers). In the latter case, the patients may be
readmitted to the same facility or to a different one. Intra-hospital pathogen transmission is
governed by a SIS model expressed by a system of ordinary differential equations.
Using a network model created for a Lower Saxony region (Germany), we showed
that the proposed model reproduces the basic properties of healthcare-associated pathogen
spread. Moreover, it shows the important contribution of the readmission of colonized pa-
tients on the prevalence of individual hospitals as well as of overall healthcare system: it
can increase the overall prevalence by the factor of 4 as compared to inter-hospital trans-
fers only. The final prevalence in individual healthcare facilities was shown to depend on
average length of stay by a non-linear concave function.
Finally, we demonstrated that the network parameters of the model may be derived from
administrative admission/discharge records. In particular, they are sufficient to obtain inter-
hospital transfer probabilities, and to express the patients’ transfer as a Markov process.
Keywords: healthcare network, network epidemiology, patient transfers, healthcare-associated
infections
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1 Introduction
Recent years brought an increased attention to the question of how the patient traffic between
healthcare facilities contributes to the spread of healthcare-associated infections in general and
multidrug resistant pathogens in particular [3]. The movements of patients between hospitals
can be divided into transfers of patients from one hospital to another (i.e. direct transfers), and
in readmission of patients to the same or another hospital after having spent some time in the
community (i.e. indirect transfers). Both direct and indirect transfers may contribute to the
spread of pathogens in healthcare networks. Interventions to prevent the spread of pathogens
in a network may differ for direct and indirect transfers. While screening of patients, who are
transferred from one hospital to another is an obvious intervention measure, this is less clear
for patients who are readmitted from the community [19]. The effectiveness/cost-effectivenes
of screening of patients after an indirect transfer depends on the time between admissions, the
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clearance rate of the pathogen, and whether the screening is applied in targeted way, i.e. based
on individual risk factors of the patient. To quantify the effectiveness of such measures, we
need to understand the contribution of indirect transfers to the spread of pathogens through the
network. In the past decade, eleven studies assessed healthcare networks in countries or fed-
eral states. All of these used national or federal registries in the US [12] [13] [21] [10] [18] or
Europe (England, France, Germany, the Netherlands) [7] [9] [4] [2] [16] [6]. The definition of
transfer and patient movement was quite heterogeneous. While some studies took into account
direct and indirect transfers independently of the length of a community stay between two hos-
pital visits [7] [2], others restricted indirect transfers to a maximum of 90 [18] or 365 days [6],
or did not consider them at all [10] when deriving hospital network flow characteristics. This
heterogeneity makes comparisons of the findings difficult and also sometimes the description of
how the indirect transfers were incorporated is not clear. For Germany, only preliminary anal-
yses were conducted [2]. Using data from one regional health care insurance in Germany, we
develop a model explicitely accounting for indirect transfers and describe selected implications
of either including or ignoring indirect transfers for the spread of mutliresistant pathogens in the
health care network, using the example of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA),
the best studied healthcare-associated pathogen.
2 Materials and Methods
2.1 Description of dataset
In German health care system over 90% of patients are insured in public insurance companies.
The remaining few percent with top income have private insurances. Overall, more than 190
public insurance companies exist. This scattered data was a reason that reimbursement data
were less accessible for scientific analysis than in other countries, in addition to high standards
of data protection, which limited their use. We used an anonymized hospital discharge database
provided by AOK Lower Saxony, a statuary regional healthcare insurance company in Germany.
AOK Lower Saxony includes almost exclusively persons living in the federal state of Lower
Saxony and covers around 30% of the local population.
The dataset used contains hospitalisation records of 1 673 247 patients for the years 2008
to 2015. For each hospital stay the anonymized patient ID, the anonymized healthcare facility
ID, the federal state where the healthcare facility is located, day of admission, day of discharge,
discharge diagnosis (ICD 10 GM code) as well as age and sex of the patient are available. For
data protection reasons, information on exact geographical location of the healthcare facilities is
not contained in the provided database. In the dataset, we identified 4 573 584 hospitalisations
in 223 facilities located in Lower Saxony, and 680 908 for healthcare facilities in other German
federal states.
Eight of these healthcare facilities were excluded from all further analyses because of in-
sufficient data (some of them had very small admission number over the period of eight years,
or there were not in operation (no patients registered in the input data) for significant time
interval). Thus, we finally consider 164 healthcare facilities located in Lower Saxony. More-
over, records without discharge diagnosis code were omitted in our analysis (about 6% of all
records). Among them, there were 257 668 hospitalisation records for facilities in Lower Sax-
ony and 79 102 records for facilities in the remaining parts of Germany.
For more detailed information on e.g. sex of patients, distributions of length of patient stays,
detailed characteristics of overlaps as well as a technical description of the provided database,
we refer to a technical report [17].
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of direct transfers (solid lines) and indirect transfers (dashed
lines), in a model comprising two exemplary hospitals. Dotted loops indicate the situations
when patients stay in the hospitals/community nodes.
2.2 Model input data
Below, we describe how we estimate parameters essential for our model from the input provided
database. In general, we construct a directed, weighted graph, based on discharge data, repre-
senting the hospital network, where nodes correspond to the healthcare facilities and weights
to transfer probabilities. As patients frequently move not only directly between hospitals, but
also they are readmitted after some time period spent outside a hospital, we define additional
community-nodes (see Sec. 2.2.3), which correspond to the communities associated with the
healthcare facilities. Patients leaving a healthcare facility go to such community-node, and then
they may be admitted to the same or another facility, c.f. Figure 1. Then, the model allows to
simulate in more detail the patient transfers from healthcare facilities to communities and back
to healthcare facilities. This way the colonized patients contribute to spread of pathogens in the
healthcare system.
2.2.1 Extraction of direct and indirect transfers from data
We distinguish two types of transfers. A direct transfer is when patients move from one facility
to the next on the same or the next day. In contrast, an indirect transfer means a new admission
to a hospital after at least one day outside of any hospital. The indirect transfer can be to the
same or a different hospital. By a duration of a transfer, we define the length of the period
between discharge and next admission. The situation when the patient is re-admitted to the
same facility after some time spent in the community is called (indirect) auto-transfer.
The direct transfers can be subject to overlapping (one day or longer) hospital stays, i.e.
situation when for the same patient at least two hospitalisations are reported with overlapping
periods (c.f. Figure 2). We detected 304 833 of these cases for healthcare facilities located
in Lower Saxony only. There are several factors contributing to the existence of overlaps.
First, the granularity of admission/discharge is in days, so that a transfer may be indicated by
a single-day overlap (112 368 cases corresponding to 38.1% of all detected overlaps) as well
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Figure 2: Examples of the results (red line) of the transfer detection algorithm in case of differ-
ent types of overlaps. Numbers on the left-hand side indicate the numeric codes for particular
units, while # stand for days of stay reported for a given healthcare facilities. For the classifica-
tion of particular types of overlaps see [17].
as two consecutive non-overlapping stays. Moreover, an overlap may be longer than one day
if a patient is supposed to return to the originating facility and a bed is kept available for this
patient. Overlaps may also occur due to coding errors in the original dataset which cannot be
corrected given the anonymized nature of the data. In the context of infection transmission, we
are interested in physical and not administrative stays of the patients. For the discussion and
analysis of the existing in database overlaps we reefer reader to an open access report [17].
In order to solve the problem of existing longer than one day overlaps in the dataset, we
derived sophisticated algorithm for the detection of direct and indirect transfers (see the Ap-
pendix 5.2 for details).
Using this algorithm (see Section 5.2), we identified 2 733 286 transfers in Lower Saxony,
among these 157 143 were direct transfers (below 6% of all transfers) and 2 576 143 indirect
transfers (above 94%, including 1 648 400 auto-transfers). In Figure 3 the fractions of both
detected types of transfers for each facility are shown. The average length of indirect transfers
(stays in the community) was 320.1 days (SD=435.2), while the average length of stays in
hospitals was 8.7 days (SD=12.2). There are only 573 045 indirect transfers (about 20% of all
transfers) with a duration of less than 30 days.
2.2.2 Sizes of hospital nodes
Since healthcare facilities are anonymized in our dataset, we do not have information on their
sizes. Moreover, we only have admission and discharge data for a subset of patients, which are
the clients of a single insurance company. To estimate the sizes of considered hospital nodes
(164 units), we count all patients present on a given day in a given facility, and then take the
average over the facility operation period. The distribution of the resulting hospital sizes is
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Figure 3: Fractions of direct and indirect (outgoing) (per day) transfers for all healthcare fa-
cilities. Healthcare facilities are ordered by the average size of the units, the smallest first.
presented in Figure 4a.
2.2.3 Sizes of community-nodes
To estimate the average number of people being subject to indirect transfers, we first investigate
the change in time of the number of people being in community between two hospitalisations.
To keep track of the originating hospital of a community dwelling patient, we propose to create
a community-node for each facility i, indexed by n + i, where n is the number of all considered
healthcare facilities. The patient is assumed to be in the community-node n + i if they were
discharged from healthcare facility i earlier and later on (after some time) be admitted to another
(possibly the same) healthcare facility j ∈ {1, ..., n} or later on did not visit any hospital in the
considered period.
To estimate the average sizes of community-nodes, we iterate through the dataset period and
for every day and for every facility we calculate the number of patients being in indirect transfer,
discharged from a given facility waiting for their admission to another one. For i community
node we also count patients who are subject to first hospital stay in unit i. Then we take the
averages of these numbers.
In addition, Figure 4c shows the relationship between healthcare facility sizes and sizes of
the corresponding community-nodes i.e. populations discharged from healthcare facilities and
waiting for (re)admission.
2.3 Model description
We describe the healthcare system as a graph, where the nodes represent healthcare facilities
and corresponding community-nodes, with weighted edges representing the probabilities of
transfers (both direct and indirect) between the nodes.
2.3.1 Patient traffic
To construct the healthcare network, the model requires input of a list of healthcare facilities
(n elements) and corresponding community-nodes (n elements) with a matrix A = [Ai j]2ni, j=1
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Figure 4: (a) Histogram of estimated hospital sizes, defined as average numbers of the patients
in the hospitals within period 2008–2015, calculated for each healthcare facility separately (164
units) — given the fact that AOK lower Saxony covers 30.52% of the population in Lower Sax-
ony, the number of beds has to be multiplied by about 3 to get the actual sizes; (b) histogram
of estimated community sizes, defined as average numbers of the patients in the given commu-
nity within period 2008-2015, calculated for each healthcare facility separately, as above the
populations have to be multiplied; (c) dependence of community-node sizes on corresponding
healthcare facilities (164 units).
determining the transfer probabilities between the nodes.
Hospital discharge data were collected for period of D ∈ N days, thus by D := {1, . . . ,D}
we denote the set of all days for which admission and discharge are registered meaning that
every number inD set corresponds to a single reported day.
Let ti j(d), ti j : D → R+ ∪ {0} for any i , j denote a number of transitions from node i to
node j, within a single day d ∈ D, which can be directly extracted from the dataset provided by
the insurance company.
We differentiate four categories of transfers, depending on indices i, j:
• i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}— direct transfers between healthcare facilities;
• i ∈ {n+1, . . . , 2n}, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}— indirect transfers from community-nodes to healthcare
8facilities;
• i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ {n + 1, . . . , 2n} — transfers from healthcare facilities to community-
nodes. They may be also interpreted as initiations of indirect transfers. Since a patient
stays in the community-node corresponding to the discharging facility, only ti,n+i , 0, and
for j , n + i we have ti j ≡ 0;
• i, j ∈ {n + 1, . . . , 2n} — transfers between community-nodes. Due to the nature of
community-nodes, there is no transfer between them, thus these elements are zero ex-
cept for tii.
Define T = [Ti j]2ni, j=1 to be a matrix of the aggregated numbers of all direct and indirect
transfers between nodes within a given time period in the following way
Ti j =
D∑
d=1
ti j(d). (2.1)
We refer to each node (hospital or community-node) by their index in the matrix T .
Now, we define ai j(d) to be the per patient probability of a transfer from node i to node j in a
single given day d ∈ D. Then for an arbitrary chosen facility, the average number of transferred
patients at a given day is expressed by ai j(d)pi, where by pi we denote the average length of
stay in the i-th node, to be defined later. Thus,
ti j(d) ≡ ai j(d)pi. (2.2)
Assuming that the probability of a transfer from node i to node j in a single given day does not
depend on choice of a day, i.e. ai j(d) ≡ Ai j = const, we get
Ti j =
D∑
d=1
ti j(d) = DAi j pi, (2.3)
and we determine non-diagonal elements of the matrix A as
Ai j =
Ti j
Dpi
=
1
Dpi
D∑
d=1
ti j(d). (2.4)
With elements Ai j := Ai j(pi) defined, we may easily determine the diagonal elements Aii :=
Aii(pi), corresponding to probability of remaining in the given node as
Aii := 1 −
∑
j,i
Ai j, (2.5)
and thus matrix A of a Markov chain is determined up to node average populations p =
[p1, . . . , p2n]. From the mathematical point of view, these values may be set to any positive
numbers, provided that 0 ≤ Aii ≤ 1. In this study, we picked the values of pi so that the average
length of stay of the patients in the nodes agree with the values determined directly from the
data.
Note that the elements on the diagonal of the transfer matrix Aii are the probabilities of stay
of patients in i unit, i = 1, .., n. By the success (at given day k) let us denote a situation when a
given patient leaves the hospital. It means that for k−1 days, with probability of Aii for each day,
they were in the hospital and then, at day k, they were dismissed with probability 1 − Aii. Thus,
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Figure 5: Visualization of the transfer probability matrix for n healthcare facilities (numbered
from 1 to n) and n community-nodes (numbered from n + 1 to n + n), n = 164: (left) schema
presenting four distinguishable blocks; (right) quantitative representation of obtained probabil-
ities, colour pixels denote the probabilities; for the purpose of visualization, all elements were
raised to the power 0.075.
we get Ak−1ii (1 − Aii). That is probability mass function of the geometric distribution. Hence, to
estimate the average length of patient stays in given hospital i one needs to calculate 1/(1−Aii).
The visualized transfer probability matrix obtained by this procedure can be found in Fig-
ure 5. It has a block structure with the indirect transfer block clearly denser (see discussion in
Sec. 2.2.1). The upper right diagonal block corresponds to discharge from healthcare facilities
to community-nodes, and thus it accounts for total indirect transfer quantity. The lower right
diagonal block corresponds to patient exchange between community-nodes. Since community-
nodes are assumed to be separated, thus only the diagonal elements are present to account for
patients remaining at the community-nodes.
In our model, patient traffic is simulated as follows. Assume that q0 := [q01, . . . , q
0
2n] is an ini-
tial patient probability distribution in healthcare facilities and community-nodes. We calculate
the probability changes in the following days by iterating
qk := qk−1A = q0Ak. (2.6)
If we start with q0 being an eigenvector of A (i.e. q0A = λq0, where λ is an eigenvalue
of matrix A), we get qk = λkq0. Moreover, if matrix A represents a regular Markov chain
(i.e. there exists k such that all elements of Ak are positive), then we can find the stationary
probability distribution w of the patients in hospitals for our network model by solving system
wA = w, since in such a case λ = 1 is a eigenvalue of matrix A. On the other hand, if the
considered Markov chain is absorbing we then would be able to calculate what is the probability
of absorption from one state to another and the average number of steps before the absorption
happens. It is natural to expect that Markov chain describing patient transfer process is not
absorbing, as obviously no such phenomenon is observed in real healthcare systems.
In our analysis, we discuss mostly the stationary distribution of patients counted as a num-
ber of patients in a given healthcare facility, while in the Markov processes we consider the
stationary probability distribution so that the vector of probabilities of patients is in given units.
However, we can easily interchange these vectors by dividing/multiplying them by the number
of patients in the healthcare system. In case of the network derived from data of Section 2.1,
10
0 50 100 150 200 250
0
20
40
60
degree
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
in-degree
out-degree
(a)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
0
5
10
15
20
out-degree
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
(b)
Figure 6: (a) In-degree and out-degree for each hospital node of the network (self-loops not
included); (b) out-degree for each community node of the network (self-loops not included),
in-degree for all community nodes are equal to 1.
the regularity of matrix A was checked numerically by empirical verification (A5 has positive
elements only), but this result is dependent on numerical errors. Nevertheless, we can use a
lemma providing an analytical argument, for details see [14] or Appendix 5. A non-zero pattern
of matrix A is presented in Figure 5. Then, in Figure 6, we present in- and out-degree of all
network nodes, calculated using transfer probability matrix A.
2.3.2 Pathogen transfer dynamics
To model the spread of pathogens within nodes, we use a susceptible-infectious-susceptible
model (SIS), [15]. In this classic approach, we assume that we have two well mixed and constant
in time populations of P individuals that can be susceptible or infectious. Let S f (t) and I f (t)
denote the fraction of susceptible and infectious individuals at time t, respectively, then by term
βS f (t)I f (t) we describe the infection process due to the contact of susceptible and infectious
individuals, while by γI f (t) we include a recovery process, so that we obtain a system of the
following ordinary differential equations
d
dt
S f (t) = −βS f (t)I f (t) + γI f (t),
d
dt
I f (t) = βS f (t)I f (t) − γI f (t),
(2.7)
where S f + I f = 1 due to the definition of S f and I f , and as a consequence
d
dt
I f (t) = −β(I f (t))2 + (β − γ)I f (t), (2.8)
which is a logistic equation, [22], with analytical solutions. Solutions to Eq. (2.8) exist globally
and are unique. Moreover, Eq. (2.8) has two steady states: a trivial one (locally stable for β < γ
and unstable for β > γ) and positive one providing β > γ (which is stable whenever it exists).
Thus, for β ≤ γ the fraction of infectious individuals goes to zero, while for β > γ fraction of
infectious individuals stabilizes at a certain level.
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In our case, in nodes, it would be favourable to operate on the number of susceptible and
infectious patients S , I instead of the fractions S f , I f . Hence, later on we consider
S (t) = S f (t) · P, I(t) = I f (t) · P, (2.9)
where I f (t) and S f (t) are solutions to (2.7) and P denotes the population size in the node. For
the MRSA example used in this study, the "infectious" compartment corresponds to individuals
currently colonized as well as to those with manifest MRSA infection and we do not distinguish
those two populations further.
We introduce this simple SIS model into all healthcare facilities in our network. In community-
nodes, we use the same model but assume no transmission (β = 0) as in this work, we focus only
on hospital acquired infections. As a consequence in the following, we assume that pk = sk + ik,
sk := [sk1, . . . , s
k
2n], i
k := [ik1, . . . , i
k
2n], where as before p
k = [pk1, ..., p
k
2n] denotes the average
distribution of the patients in network nodes after k iterations, while ik and sk stand for average
distributions of infectious and susceptible patients in nodes, respectively.
Now let us define the numerical subroutine sisolve as follows. For a given S 0, I0, t0, t1, β,
γ, it returns values S 1, I1 (i.e. the numbers of susceptible and infectious individuals after time
t1 − t0 = 1 day, respectively), where
S 1 := S (t1), I1 := I(t1), (2.10)
where functions S , I are the solutions of the SIS model (with initial condition S (t0) = S 0 and
I(t0) = I0) given by (2.9) . So basically sisolve : R6 → R2 together with the SIS model defines
our modelling approach as follows:
Require: s0 = [s01, . . . , s
0
2n], i
0 := [i01, . . . , i
0
2n], T ∈ N;
1: t := 0;
2: s = s0;
3: i = i0;
4: while t < T do
5: for all j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n} do
6: (s j, i j) := sisolve(s j, i j, t, t + 1, β, γ);
7: end for
8: s := sA;
9: i := iA;
10: st := s; it := i; . These are the results
11: end while
Loop 5 can be parallelized. This is also true for multiplications 8, 9, but here some inter-
process information exchange is necessary and thus for our designed numerical procedure there
is no need of having the same recovery and transmission rates for all healthcare facilities and/or
community-nodes. The results of the described algorithm, i.e. distribution of susceptible and
infectious patients versus discrete time steps, are computed in line 10.
We assume that the time-step is one day, and that the recovery and transmission rates do not
vary between the facilities. This behaviour may be easily modified if necessary. We also assume
that the transfer probabilities for infectious patients and susceptible patients are the same (lines
8, 9). To change this assumption, we will have to generate different Markov Chain matrices for
these groups, but otherwise the presented algorithm remains unchanged.
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Table 1: SIS parameters used in simulations.
Set type Parameter Reference values Unit Reference
MRSA
Recovery rate (γ) 1/365 day−1 [20, 7, 8]
Transmission rate in hospital (β) 0.06 day−1 see Section 2.4
Transmission rate in community (β) 0 day−1 assumed
Parameter
analysis
Recovery rate (γ) 0.5/365–8/365 day−1 assumed
Transmission rate in hospital (β) 0.04–0.85 day−1 assumed
Transmission rate in community (β) 0 day−1 assumed
Indirect
transfer
impact
Recovery rate in hospital (γh) 1/365 day−1 [20, 7, 8]
Recovery rate in community (γc) 0.125/365–4096/365 day−1 see Section 2.4
Transmission rate in hospital (β) 0.06 day−1 see Section 2.4
Transmission rate in community (β) 0 day−1 assumed
2.4 Estimation of parameters for transmission and recovery
For the purpose of this paper, we use as reference parameters values already reported in the
literature for methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). If necessary, we vary the
reference values to analyse in-depth the behaviour of our model. The recovery rate γ is equal
to one over mean time spent by an individual in the infectious class and it is measured in
units of day−1. Following Scanvic et al. [20] and Donker et al. [7, 8], we assume that the
mean time of MRSA colonization is 365 days leading to γ = 1/365 day−1. In addition, we
assume that recovery rates in particular facilities do not depend on the patient characteristics
or healthcare facility characteristics itself. Thus, for all nodes representing healthcare facilities,
we use the same value for the recovery rate. The same holds for the all community-nodes if
not indicated otherwise. To determine the reference transmission rate value is not an easy task.
In papers focusing particularly on MRSA transmissions and using SIS model to mimic bacteria
transmission like [9, 7] this parameter was not reported. On the other hand, in [8] parameter β
was set at 0.085, while in [5] wild range of the transmission parameters were tested, cf. Table 1
in [5].
We additionally assume that in the community-nodes representing community patients can
not get colonized and thus transmission rates for the community-nodes are set to zero (Table 1).
For the set of simulations presenting the impact of the SIS model parameters on the dynamics of
the whole model we vary both SIS parameters: recovery rate and transmission rate, as reported
in Table 1 set type MRSA.
For the set of simulations investigating the impact of indirect transfers, we start with a
specific parameter combination, γh := γc = 1/365 day−1 and β = 0.06 day−1, resulting in
stabilization of the system-wide community prevalence within period of 7000 days at the level
of 6.7%, and stabilization of the system-wide hospital prevalence at the level of 17.8%. The
latter prevalence is close to the mean prevalence reported in [7, 9, 8] for considered bacteria.
In subsequent simulations, we model the effect of increased indirect-transfer pathogen trans-
mission between the facilities by investigating the wide spectrum of γc parameters. We start
from the value 0.125/365 day−1 ≈ 3.42 × 10−4 day−1 corresponding to much lower (than the
one proposed in [20, 7, 8]) recovery in community and then we gradually increase the recovery
rate in the community up to 4096/365 ≈ day−111 day−1, which gives mean duration of recov-
ery of about two hours. Using this approach, the movement of patients in the system remains the
same, but the patients recover faster in the community, so that pathogen transmission through
this channel is reduced, and in the most extreme case (γc = 4096/365 day−1 ≈ 11 day−1) it is
virtually disabled. In this case, the transmission is limited to the hospital environment only.
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2.5 Numerical simulation setup
For simulations of the pathogen spread in the healthcare network, we use software developed
by K. Sakowski and M.J. Piotrowska (for details and documentations see [1]). The software is
written in Python and comprises two main modules: one for patient transfers between healthcare
facilities and one for pathogen spread within healthcare facilities. The former module is superior
to the latter one in the sense that it governs the simulation flow. Moreover, it performs the
parallelization through the MPI library.
In the first step, the healthcare facility nodes (and their community-nodes, if applicable)
are distributed between the available processors. Next, the transfer matrix, described in detail
in Section 2.3.1, is divided into submatrices, corresponding to blocks of nodes given to the
subsequent processes; then these blocks are also distributed to the corresponding processors.
The internal model, responsible for calling independent instances of the intra-facility model for
pathogen spread simulation with a SIS model as defined in Section 2.3.2, is then initialized.
After the intra-facility simulations (covering one day period) are finished, the patients are being
transferred between nodes and this process is repeated for the next day, and so on.
2.6 Simulation plan
Using static network structure described above and the SIS transmission model, we first assess
how MRSA spreads in the network (including direct and indirect transfers) and how it depends
on the parameters describing dynamics of the spread of the bacteriae within healthcare facilities
and corresponding community. We also check if the starting point of spread of infection strongly
influences model dynamics.
A particular focus is placed on the role of transmission parameters and the initial infec-
tion point for the behaviour of the system until a steady state is reached, and on the preva-
lence of MRSA colonization during steady state in individual healthcare facilities and their
corresponding community nodes. By increasing the recovery rate in community-nodes from
0.125/365 day−1 to about 4096/365 day−1 (instant recovery in the community), we investigate
the effects of stepwise restricting the contribution of indirect transfers to pathogen spread.
3 Results
3.1 Impact of the initial infection point
Let us consider SIS reference parameters for MRSA in Table 1. Independently of the initial
starting point of pathogen spread, we observed three phases of the spread of MRSA in our net-
work. In the initial phase, the overall prevalence was small, close to zero. With time prevalence
increases slowly, mainly in the initially colonized facility. Then, there is a transition phase,
where the number of colonized patients increases rapidly. The increase in prevalence in this
phase is similar to the behaviour of an arctan function near zero. Then, the final prevalence is
reached in individual facilities and overall. The proportion of infectious individuals does not
change any more, so that a final steady state is reached.
These final states are similar, independently of the initially infected healthcare facility (see
Figure 7). These results suggest that there is a single final state, corresponding to some sta-
tionary state of the simulated system. The time to reach the final state depends on the initial
conditions, but differences are very small. The initial phase lasts about 400-600 days, and then
the transition phase takes up to 7700 days (see Figure 7).
14
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
300
400
500
600
facility number
ph
as
e
du
ra
tio
n
in
da
ys
phase 1 (healthcare facilities)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
7,400
7,500
7,600
7,700
facility number
phase 2 (healthcare facilities)
Figure 7: Average system-wide phase durations expressed in days versus healthcare facility
which was selected as the initial infection point (sorted by avg. hospital size, with the small-
est first). Phase 1 denotes beginning of the epidemic (prevalence lower than 10% of the final
prevalence); phase 2 denotes transition state (prevalence < 99.9% final prevalence). The phase
durations correspond to a system-wide prevalence, not to individual facility prevalences. Infec-
tion was started by a single infectious patient originating from a given facilities.
If we focus on the individual facilities (see Figures 8 and 9), there is a high heterogeneity
in lengths of the studied phases. Some facilities reach their final state within 4000 days; the
mean duration of initial phase is, however, at more than 10000 days. These patterns do not
depend on the initial conditions under consideration (except for the initial infection points,
where the spread is faster). Moreover, there is no clear association between size of a facility
and final prevalence or time to reach it. However, lower final prevalence generally corresponds
to longer transition phase. The final prevalence in the community is generally much lower
than in the healthcare facilities. There is a strong association between the combined length
of initial/transition phases for healthcare facilities and their corresponding community-nodes.
Analogous patterns can be observed for individual facility/community-node combinations —
the final prevalence for individual community-nodes is generally much lower than the final
prevalence of the corresponding facility (Figure 10).
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Figure 8: Individual phase ends in healthcare facilities and in corresponding community-nodes.
Presented results are averaged-out amid all possible initial infection points.
facilities community-nodes
Figure 9: Network prevalence (over time) in percentage of infectious individuals per healthcare
facility (left column) and corresponding community-node (right column). Deep blue corre-
sponds to low infection proportions (lower than 20%); yellow or red to facilities with high
infection proportions (> 50%). Healthcare facilities are ordered by average size, with the small-
est first. The process was started by a single infectious patient located in facility number: (upper
row) 1 (the smallest); (lower row) 164 (the biggest).
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Figure 10: Comparison of the final percentage of infectious individuals in given
hospitals/community-nodes. Healthcare facilities are ordered by the average size of hospitals,
the smallest first. Transmission was started by a single infectious patient originating from a
given facility, and the results are averaged out through all initial facilities. However, differences
of the final prevalence between initial originating facilities are negligible.
3.2 Influence of SIS parameters on the final prevalence
In Figures 11a–11b, we present the effect of variation in transmission rates and recovery rates
in the SIS model on the cumulative proportion of all susceptible (blue) and infectious (red)
individuals in healthcare facilities (counted at one point) for the sets of parameters being per-
turbations of the SIS reference values reported in Table 1 (set type: MRSA) as indicated in
legends. For all presented simulations, infection was initiated by the introduction of uniformly
distributed 0.1% infectious patient in whole population.
In a model accounting for both direct and indirect transfers, our results (Figure 11) indicate
that both parameters, the transmission rate β and the recovery rate γ, impact the final network
prevalence in line with what would be expected. Larger β indicates faster spread of the pathogen
while larger γ values result in lower prevalence in the whole network at steady state. The system
wide effect is smaller for relative changes in β than in γ.
The length of the initial infection phase (i.e. the time when the percentage of the colonized
patients is below 10% of the final prevalence) seems to be highly dependent on the parameter β.
This effect is visible in all the presented simulations. If we look closer at the effect of varying
recovery rates γ (Figure 11b), we find a similar behaviour, but the changes are milder.
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Figure 11: (a) Effect of the change of the transmission rate on the percentage of susceptible
(blue) and infective (red) individuals in the healthcare facilities network. (b) Effect of the change
of the recovery rate on the percentage of susceptible (blue) and infectious (red) individuals in
the healthcare facility network. Spread of infection was started by a single infectious patient
located in a (left) small, (right) big facility.
3.3 Impact of indirect transfers
In order to assess the role of indirect transfers for pathogen spread, in this section we change
the recovery rates in community nodes (γc), which in generally differ from the recovery rates in
corresponding hospitals (γh), as indicated in Table 1 (set type: indirect transfer impact).
In Figure 12, we show how the prevalence is affected. Starting from the prevalences at level
of ≈ 77% and ≈ 68% for the communities and healthcare facilities, respectively, the prevalences
decrease monotonically with increasing γc. For the simulations with γc > 128/365 day−1 ≈
0.35 day−1, network prevalence in hospitals, understood as percentage of infectious individuals,
stabilizes at the level of about 4.2%. For community nodes it systematically decreases falling
below 0,1% for γc greater than 16/365 day−1 ≈ 4.38 × 10−2 day−1.
As presented in Figure 13, the final prevalence between the facilities and corresponding
communities varies. Moreover, this diversity also changes depending on the value of γc pa-
rameter. Nevertheless, there is a small fraction of facilities, where the prevalence is very high
independently of the community recovery rate. Similar effect we observe for communities.
However, in this case for sufficiently high γc all communities have very low prevalence.
Another feature affected by transmission of the pathogen via indirect transfers is the time
needed to reach the final state (see Figure 14a). What is interesting, time to reach the end of
phase 1 (prevalence lower than 10% of the final prevalence) shows for small γc a monotone de-
crease, while it is not the case for the end of phase 2 (i.e. prevalence < 99.9% final prevalence).
Additional study of the dependences of variety of the correlation coefficient for different
γc values manifests that correlation coefficients between: final prevalence in the hospitals and
community nodes (corrA), final prevalence in the hospitals and the average length of stay in
hospitals (corrB) and final prevalence in communities and the average length of stay in hospitals
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Figure 12: Dependence of network prevalence in healthcare facilities and corresponding
community-nodes (reported for the last day) on different values of γc parameter in community-
nodes, if γh = 1/365 for all hospitals. Initial fraction of the colonized people is 0.1% uniformly
distributed in the whole population. (left) Data presented in log-log scale. (right) Data presented
in semilog(x) scale.
(a) (b)
Figure 13: Final network prevalence depending on the value of γc parameter (vertical axis)
for: (a) all considered hospitals, (b) corresponding community nodes. Initial condition for all
simulations is the same: 0.1% uniformly-distributed colonized patients. Facilities are sorted by
increasing average size.
(corrC), are strongly positive for all considered γc values, see Figure 14b. Moreover, again we
see accurate functional dependence of the value of community recovery rate. For small γc,
strongest correlation is pronounced between final prevalence in the hospitals and corresponding
community nodes. However, it slightly decreases with increasing γc, while at the same time
correlations between final prevalence in the hospitals (or in communities) and the average length
of stay in hospitals increases. On the other hand, for sufficiently large community recovery rate
(γc > 0.1 day−1), when pathogen spread via community nodes is minor or neglectable, all
the correlations stabilise at certain levels and become independent of γc. The investigation of
correlations between: final prevalence in hospitals (or community nodes) with in- or out-degree
of hospital nodes (or out-degree of community nodes) brought no statistically significant results.
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Figure 14: (a) System-wide phase ends in healthcare facilities for different γc. (b) Dependence
of the correlation coefficients on γc value (semi-log scale), corrA is the correlation coefficient
between final hospital prevalences and corresponding communities prevalences; corrB – cor-
relation coefficient between final hospital prevalences and average length of stay in hospitals;
corrC – correlation coefficient between final community prevalences and average length of stay
in corresponding hospitals. Initial condition for all simulations is the same 0.1% uniformly-
distributed colonized patients.
3.4 Influence of the length of stay on the prevalence
In Figure 15a we present the distribution of average length of stays (in days) for considered
hospitals, as discussed in Section 2.3.1. In most cases, it is between 7–9 days.
In Figure 15b the dependence between the average length of stay (all considered hospitals)
and the average prevalences calculated for each hospital are presented. The prevalence for each
hospital was calculated based on the simulations presented in Sec. 3.1 by taking the average
from the simulations where the origin of the colonization was changed (164 simulations in
total). The obtained dependence is rather non-linear however most points are focused in one
area which strongly affecting results of regression methods.
20
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
20
40
60
80
100
mean lenght of stay (in days)
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
(a)
20 40 60 80 100
0
20
40
60
80
100
mean length of stay (in days)
av
.p
re
va
le
nc
e
(i
n
%
)
(b)
Figure 15: (a) Distribution of length of stay (in days) for all considered hospitals (164 units).
(b) Average length of stay vs. average prevalence calculated for each hospital (all considered
units).
4 Conclusion and Discussion
We investigated the dynamics of MRSA as an example for multidrug resistant bacteria in pro-
posed network model of patient traffic in the German healthcare system taking into account
indirect patient transfers and patients staying for some time in the community before readmis-
sions to hospitals. Due to the characteristic of pathogens, for which transmission occurs mostly
in hospitals, patient exchange between facilities is a main driver of their spread. We also showed
how to derive the graph for a given healthcare system from an anonymized admission/discharge
database, as the transfer databases are not available. With every healthcare facility we asso-
ciate two graph nodes, one corresponding to the patients remaining in the facility, and the other
for former patients waiting for readmission. To examine the proposed approach, we presented
numerical stimulations for a healthcare system of Lower Saxony, Federal Republic of Germany.
Our analysis of the AOK Lower Saxony anonymized database for years 2008–2015 shows
that patient transfers are mostly well balanced and thus we can use deterministic model and in
particular Markov chain to describe the patients movement within the network. Nevertheless,
derived probability matrix defining Markov process is not symmetric, indicating the directed
graphs should be used instead of the indirected one. It should be pointed out that a Markov
probability matrix can be non-symmetric even for perfectly balanced transfers because of dif-
ferent sizes of facilities, and thus different probability related to the same patient numbers.
Although we propose simplified deterministic transfer model, stationary probability distribu-
tion (eigenvector corresponding to eigenvalue equal to 1) are close to values estimated directly
from data, underlining the correctness of proposed approach.
We found that only 6% of patients in our underlying dataset are transferred directly. The
remaining 94% spend some time in the community before readmission. From these transfers,
we deduced a Markov process transfer probability matrix, which in combination with a SIS
intra-hospital model determines the dynamics of the pathogen transmission process within the
hospital network. We found that a typical spread pattern in such a network consists of three
phases. In the first phase (initial), the rate of colonized patients is close to 0 and the length of
this phase is strongly associated with the contact rate β. In the second phase (transient), the
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prevalence rapidly increases, and then it reaches a stable level, which is the final third phase
(stable). Length of these phases and final prevalence depends on β and on the recovery rate γ.
In addition we observed that if we look at the stable-state colonization rate of the individual
facilities, it is not uniform (despite uniform β and γ). Mean length of stay is one of the deter-
minants of prevalence at steady state (understood as the state after sufficiently long time, when
the changes are not pronounced anymore) with the longer stays being associated with higher
prevalence. The node position in the network may also play an important role. However, our
analysis of node degrees shows no statistically significant correlation between in-degrees (or
out-degrees) and the prevalence in hospital nodes or corresponding community nodes. Addi-
tionally, we observe that the final prevalence in units is independent of the facility, from which
the pathogen spread was initiated in, however the initial dynamics may slightly differ.
In the main part of our analysis we found that taking the indirect transfers into account
has a significant effect on the final prevalence in the healthcare system. We show that restrict-
ing the pathogen spread to direct-transfers only, leads to 4.2% final system wide prevalence,
while including indirect transfers leads to a prevalence increase to almost 18%. This example
demonstrates that this additional pathogen transmission channel may lead to relevant increases
in the prevalence and cannot be ignored. Limiting the simulation to the healthcare system, and
ignoring the indirect transfers and the community, may result in underestimation of the preva-
lence. There are also differences in the transmission dynamics. For high γc (corresponding to
transmission of MRSA via the direct transfers only) the system reaches the stable state in 2–3
years, while with indirect transfers it needs about 20 years to reach almost 18% prevalence.
Dependent on the type of pathogen studied and its true clearance rate in the general popula-
tion, network flows representing indirect transfers within a pre-defined time frame need to be
taken into account to understand the true transmission dynamics in a healthcare network, and
the effectiveness of potential infection control measures.
Moreover, using proposed model, we have also found a non-linear concave functional de-
pendence of the prevalence in the hospitals on the average length of stay in that facilities, which
can be an useful tool for estimation of the prevalence in given hospitals, knowing the average
length of patient stays of the considered facility. However, this dependence is based strongly
on the network structure, and in the future we will address that issue studying different hospital
networks.
One example of emerging multi-resistant pathogens, which are more complex to model
than MRSA, are multi-resistant gram-negative bacteria, especially Enterobacteriacaeae. In [11],
the prospective surveillance data from 13 European intensive care units were used to estimate
transmission rates of Escherichia coli and E. coli Enterobacteriaceae. This group of pathogens
share resistance genes, but have very different transmission characteristics, transmission ways
and clearance rates, making the correct choice of time frames for indirect transfers more diffi-
cult [11].
Infection control by adjustment of the network structure (as e.g. proposed by Donker et al.
in [9]), provide another level of complexity which can be considered in combination with clas-
sic infection control measures focusing on individual healthcare facilities. In [13], Lee et al.
have shown that distribution of infection control measures based on network characteristics can
improve effectiveness of infection control measures and save resources at the same time. On the
other hand, our analysis showed that the decrease of the transferability of the pathogen via the
community does not significantly influence the correlation between the final network prevalence
(in the facilities and corresponding communities) and average lengths of stays in hospitals.
The study presented in this paper is performed for a single federal state in Germany. Pro-
vided that there are available data, the same may be done for additional regions, group of coun-
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tries. One further challenge will be to determine patient transfer between administrative regions.
Our model can be further expanded by taking into account infection control measures: this re-
quire more detailed modelling at the intra-hospital level. Screening, isolation of colonized
patients and introduction of effective treatment may be simulated for example by decreasing β.
Also, additional stratification of risk may be added by similar means.
5 Appendix
5.1 Lemma 5.1
The proof of the following lemma can be find in [14].
Lemma 5.1 Assume that A = [Ai j]ki, j=1 is a k × k dimensional real matrix such that
1. ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i , j, Ai j ≥ 0,
2. ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , k} A j j > 0,
3. ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k} ∑kj=1 Ai j = 1,
4. ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k} ∃ i0 = i, i1, . . . , in−1, in = j such that ∀m ∈ {1, . . . , n} Aim−1im > 0.
Then A is a stochastic regular matrix.
This lemma may be applied to hospital transfer probabililty matrices of this paper. Clearly, As-
sumption 1 of Lemma 5.1 is satisfied due definition (2.4), as all the elements are non-negative.
Assumption 2 is more subtle, as in general A j j can be equal to 0. It is however rather unlikely,
as due to (2.4) it would imply that no patients would stay in the healthcare facility overnight
ever. Assumption 3 is a direct consequence of definition (2.5). Assumption 4 means that for
every two facilities, there is some (potential) transfer path between them. Actually, it is not nec-
essary that any patient follow this whole path, but there must be some patient transfer for every
component. Thus, the transfer path must exist between every two facilities, in both directions.
5.2 Transfer classification algorithm
To classify patient transfers properly, we propose a heuristic algorithm, which detects and clas-
sifies transfers from the available claims database in a general manner. Please note that we use
in description of the algorithm: i to denote days, l for facilities, p for patients and symbols Ai,
d, D, Hi, Li, Pi defined in the text. This notation is local, i.e. it will be used in description of
this algorithm , however some of these symbols will be later used for different notions.
Our algorithm operates at the basis of individual patients and works as follows. Let H denote
a set of healthcare facilities. Let us take a patient and the admission/discharge table related to
their hospital stays. Then by D := {0, 1, . . . , d} we denote a set of days at which this patient
stays in any healthcare facility. We assume that the order of the indices D corresponds to the
order of days, but it is possible that these days are not consecutive, i.e. days i and i + 1 may
actually be separated by some period of time.
Then let Hi ⊂ H be a set of healthcare facilities in which the patient formally stays at day i,
i.e. there is at least one entry in the considered admission/discharge dataset, which corresponds
to this patient while the day i is between the admission date and discharge date of this entry (both
inclusive). Moreover, we define H−1 := ∅ and a set of newly-arrived facilities as Ai := Hi\Hi−1
while a set of recently-left facilities is denoted by Li := Hi−1\Hi.
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Hi can have than one element when entries overlap and patients are formally assigned to
multiple facilities at the same day. To track such situations, we also define sets Pi ⊂ H, which
correspond to facilities in which we think the patient is present at day i. These sets will be
determined by the proposed heuristic.
If i − 1 and i are consecutive days, we check every new facility a ∈ Ai. Then for every
p ∈ Pi−1 we deduce a transfer from p to a.
Then for any facility l ∈ Li ∩ Pi−1 which the patient formally leaves at day i and in which
they were present at day i − 1, and for any facility h ∈ Hi in which they formally are at day i,
we deduce a transfer from l to h. We take h ∈ Hi instead of for example h ∈ Pi−1. To account
for the case, when a patient has a temporary transfer to another facility. When the new stay
finishes, patients return to the original facility, in which they are now considered as not present
(the facility is not in Pi−1), but formally they have a bed reserved there (it is in Hi).
We determine Pi as follows:
• If there is no new admission or discharge (Ai = Li = ∅), then nothing changes (Pi := Pi−1).
• If there are new admissions (Ai , ∅, Li = ∅), then we deduce that the patient is transferred
to these new locations and Pi := Ai. We cannot determine without additional information
whether they are still present in other places from Hi or not, so we assume that beds are
only held for them.
• If there are discharges (Li , ∅), then any facility left is removed from Pi; all current
facilities are added to this set, as we assume that the patients are returning to the original
facilities. So, depending on whether there were new admissions (Ai , ∅) or not (Ai = ∅),
we define Pi = (Ai\Li) ∪ Hi or Pi = (Pi−1\Li) ∪ Hi.
On the other hand, if i and i + 1 are not consecutive days, i.e if there is at least one day in
between, then for every p ∈ Pi−1 and for every a ∈ Ai we deduce a transfer from p to a and we
set Pi := Ai. Note that it is possible that Pi−1∩Ai , ∅, thus we can deduce indirect auto-transfers
also. Since we need some initial value, we define P−1 := ∅ and we assume that −1 and 0 are not
consecutive days.
This procedure is executed for each patient from the dataset; afterwards transfers are accu-
mulated.
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